非对称信息下考虑双方风险态度的外包合同设计

研究了发包方和接包方不同风险偏好组合下,道德风险和逆向选择并存时的发包方对接包方的外包合同设计问题.结合委托代理理论,为发包方设计合同,从而激励接包方积极参与并甄别其私有信息,进而分析非对称信息和风险偏好对双方策略和收益的影响.结果表明,双重信息非对称下双方的策略和收益取决于双方风险偏好组合和信息非对称程度.结果体现双方风险态度对决策的影响和信息的价值,为外包合同设计提供了有力的决策支持.

Design of Outsourcing Contract Considering the Risk Attitude of Both Sides with Asymmetric Information

The outsourcing contract design with both moral hazard and adverse selection was investigated under different risk attitude combination between the client and the provider. Based on the principal agent theory, the contract was designed which was used by the client to motivate the provider’s participation and screen its true private information. Furthermore, the impact of the asymmetric information and risk attitude combination on the corresponding optimal strategies and expected profit were analyzed. The analysis results showed that with dual asymmetric information, the optimal strategies and expected profit of both sides were depended on the risk attitude combination as well as the asymmetric information. The above results also implied the impact of the risk attitude on the decisions of both sides as well as the value of information, and provided the decision support for the outsourcing contract design.