知识与默认

我们将为德性知识论引入一种独特的默认假设(default assumptions)概念,后者一般地构成了胜任力。一个默认假设就是一个特定背景条件获得的假设,即(a)是一种相应的SSS胜任力处于适当位置所必需的,但是(b)允许不安全地处于适当位置,而且不为行动者所知。因此,行动者可能要冒一个背景条件失败的风险,以及紧接着而来的胜任力的丧失,而且他们可能不知道自己冒了这种风险。一种实用论入侵解释了我们为什么在日常语境中能够诉诸默认假设。所以,我们的德性知识论包含默认假设之后,我们能够对哲学怀疑论进行一种全新的处理,从而为摩尔和笛卡尔施以援手。

Knowledge and Default

We will draw on virtue epistemology for a distinctive notion of default assumptions,which constitutes competences generally.A default assumption is an assumption that a certain background condition obtains,one that (a) is required for a corresponding triple-S competence to be in place,but (b) is allowably in place unsafely,and unbeknownst to the agent.A kind of pragmatic encroachment give an explanation why we can appeal to default assumptions in our ordinary context.So,with our embrace of default assumptions within virtue epistemology,we enable a fresh treatment of philosophical skepticism and offer a helping hand to Moore and Descartes.