利用声誉信息的机会主义行为对合作的影响

基于声誉的间接回报是合作演化的一类重要机制,其中的个体对声誉好的个体倾向合作,但自利个体利用声誉信息的机会主义是对合作的威胁。本文建立了演化博弈模型,群体中包含回报型个体和投机型个体。对一个简化模型的分析表明,当一代中交互次数较少时,投机型个体能够入侵回报型群体。对复杂情景的计算机仿真结果表明:当采用声誉对称计算方式时,群体合作水平较低;当采用声誉非对称计算方式时,群体合作水平显著提高。说明声誉非对称计算方式能够抑制机会主义促进合作。

Cooperation in Population of Opportunists Mediated by Reputation

Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is an important mechanism in the evolution of cooperation. In this situation players preferentially cooperate with good reputation ones. A concern is that the self-interested individuals' opportunism mediated by reputation will erode cooperation. In this paper an evolutionary game model was built. The population consists of reciprocators and opportunists. Analysis on a simple model shows that opportunists can invade the population of reciprocators with sporadic interactions in a generation. Computer simulation on a complex scenario shows that with mode of symmetric reputation adjustment cooperation rate is low; with asymmetric mode cooperation rate is high. The conclusion is that asymmetric reputation adjustment can depress opportunists and promote cooperation.