Animal deception and the content of signals |
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| Authors: | Don Fallis Peter J. Lewis |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave, 413 Renaissance Park, Boston, MA, 02115, USA;2. Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, 6035 Thornton Hall, 19 College St, Hanover, NH, 03755, USA;1. Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, 1866 Main Mall, Buchanan E370, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6T 1Z1;2. Department of Philosophy, Mount Allison University, 63D York St, Sackville, New Brunswick, E4L 1G9, Canada;3. School of Sustainability and School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, Wrigley Hall, 800 Cady Mall #108, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA |
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| Abstract: | In cases of animal mimicry, the receiver of the signal learns the truth that he is either dealing with the real thing or with a mimic. Thus, despite being a prototypical example of animal deception, mimicry does not seem to qualify as deception on the traditional definition, since the receiver is not actually misled. We offer a new account of propositional content in sender-receiver games that explains how the receiver is misled (and deceived) by mimicry. We show that previous accounts of deception, and of propositional content, give incorrect results about whether certain signals are deceptive. |
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| Keywords: | Withholding information Deception Propositional content Animal signaling Mimicry Game theory |
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