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对等收费下网络之间的价格竞争
引用本文:王德财,张维华,骆品亮.对等收费下网络之间的价格竞争[J].复旦学报(自然科学版),2001,40(6):665-669.
作者姓名:王德财  张维华  骆品亮
作者单位:复旦大学管理学院,
基金项目:复旦大学三年行动计划交叉重点学科“电子商务”研究基金资助项目
摘    要:为促进竞争对手进入由在位者支配的网络产业,各国政府往往会制订一些管理定价规划,最常见的是对等收费,即对互联各方索取相同的接收费用,消除网内和网间的价格差别,使垄断可能性降低,据此,以电信市场为例,评估对等收费对网络间价格竞争的影响,在古诺模型和豪泰林模型的基础上,建立两个互联网络的价格竞争模型,在对称均衡下,网间电话的价格超过网内电话价格,这种内部电话折扣,即网络外部性促使市场倾斜,使产业走向垄断,通过对接收等价收取费用,即对等收费,消除了网内和网间价格差别,使垄断可能性降低。

关 键 词:对等收费  网络外部性  倾斜市场  价格竞争  价格差别  垄断  电信企业
文章编号:0427-7104(2001)06-0665-05

Pricing Competition under the Principle of Reciprocity
WANG De-cai,ZHANG Wei-hua,LUO Ping-liang.Pricing Competition under the Principle of Reciprocity[J].Journal of Fudan University(Natural Science),2001,40(6):665-669.
Authors:WANG De-cai  ZHANG Wei-hua  LUO Ping-liang
Abstract:It evaluates the effectiveness of the reciprocity pricing rule intended to promote entry into a network industry dominated by an incumbent carrier is studied.Drawing on the work of Cournot and Hotelling,a model of competiton between two interconnected networks are builded.In a symmetric equilibrium,the price of cross-network calls exceeds the price of internal calls.This tends to "tip" the industry to a monopoly equlibrium as a network externality.Byequalizing charges for terminating calls,reciprocity eliminates differences between internal and cross network prices and makes monopoly less likely.
Keywords:reciprocity  network externality  tip market  lock-in  double marginalization
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