PPP项目主体特征对隧道行为的影响

PPP项目中隧道行为频发,从各利益主体特征与隧道行为的关系出发,选取A股PPP概念板块中360家公司的面板数据作为样本,构建一种可解决存在关键和潜在门限变量门限效应的二阶段改进面板门限模型,实证分析各门限变量下两权分离度对PPP利益主体隧道行为的影响。研究表明：基于政企合作度与企业性质规模及其分类下的一般门限变量均存在门限特征。具体而言,政企合作度越高的PPP项目主体,较高的负债和股权制衡度以及较低的银行债务和股权集中度下,两权分离度越能降低隧道行为;企业性质规模越高的PPP项目主体,较低的银行债务比率、股权集中度和股权制衡度下,两权分离度越能降低隧道行为,而较低或很高的负债都将引发隧道行为。

Influence of Main Characteristics ofPPP-Related Project on Tunnel Behavior: An Empirical Analysis Based on ImprovedPanel Threshold Model

Tunnel behavior frequently occurs in PPP projects. Based on the relationship between the characteristics of various stakeholders and the tunnel behavior, the panel data of 360 companies in the A-share PPP concept section are selected as samples to construct an improved panel threshold model that can solve the critical and potential threshold variables. The second-stage improved panel threshold model is used to empirically analyze the influence of the separation of two weights on the PPP stakeholder tunnel behavior at each variable. The result shows that there are threshold characteristics on the government-private cooperation degree and the size and nature of the enterprise as well as the general threshold variables under the classification. Specifically, for enterprises with a higher government-enterprise cooperation in the PPP project, more separation of the two powers can reduce the tunnel effect with conditions of a higher debt and equity balance as well as a lower bank debt and equity concentration. For the enterprise with a bigger nature size parameter, more separation of the two powers can reduce the tunneling effect at a lower bank debt ratio, equity concentration, and equity balance, while a lower or higher debt will lead to the tunnel behavior.