Locke’s construction of the idea of power

I explain Locke’s account of the origin of our idea of power, showing that it concerns the idea of the disposition to act or change, and that this idea is constructed out of the ideas of action or change. I also show how Locke could have modified his account to avoid Hume’s criticism and argue that his neglect to do so reflects a studied neglect of taxonomy, an ambiguity in the notion of capacity, and complications in Locke’s conception of simple ideas. A comparison of the two empiricists reveals that not only do they disagree about the role of reason in the origin of our idea of power, but they are also talking about different ideas. Within the framework of Locke’s account of the origin of the idea of power, I explain why he believes that bodies only provide us with an obscure idea of active power. I conclude by defending his insight that there is a deep connection between the ability to predict and the idea of power.