| 竞争作用不对称下技术创新投资的期权博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄学军,吴冲锋. 竞争作用不对称下技术创新投资的期权博弈分析[J]. 系统工程, 2005, 23(11): 75-78 |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄学军 吴冲锋 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目（70331001）. |
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| 摘 要： | 垄断优势外的竞争优势难以复制给抢先投资进入的企业带来正的效应，竞争给抢先进入的企业造成负的外部性，本文建立了考察上述两种竞争导致作用不对等情形下的期权博弈模型。通过数值分析，发现竞争优势越大会激励企业更早抢先进入，负外部性越大，追随者的企业进入门槛值会减少，并给出简要的经济学含义。
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| 关 键 词： | 期权博弈 技术创新 不对称 竞争 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-4098（2005）11-0075-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-03-19 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-03-192005-08-22 |
An Option Game Analysis about Technology Innovation Investment under Asymmetric Competition Interaction |
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| HUANG Xue-jun,WU Chong-feng. An Option Game Analysis about Technology Innovation Investment under Asymmetric Competition Interaction[J]. Systems Engineering, 2005, 23(11): 75-78 |
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| Authors: | HUANG Xue-jun WU Chong-feng |
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| Affiliation: | Aetna School of Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052,China |
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| Abstract: | Leader's firm holds competition advantage besides monopoly advantage that is difficult to reproduce by other firms.Negative externalities on leader's firm are coming from competitor.The option game model is set up under the above two asymmetric competition cases.The conclusion is drawn through modeling and simulating that the more competition(advantage,)the more firm has incentive to preempt;the more negative externalities,the lesser the follower's entry threshold.The simple economics implication is presented. |
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| Keywords: | Game Option Technology Innovation Asymmetry Competition |
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