| 银企信贷重复博弈的模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 田银华,何建明,曹家瑛. 银企信贷重复博弈的模型分析[J]. 系统工程, 2005, 23(11): 82-84 |
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| 作者姓名： | 田银华 何建明 曹家瑛 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 湘潭大学,商学院,湖南,湘潭,411105;湖南科技大学,湖南,湘潭,411201
2. 湘潭大学,商学院,湖南,湘潭,411105 |
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| 摘 要： | 银企关系的稳定与否最终体现在信贷关系上，在信息不对称的前提下，基于企业对其声誉的考虑，本文论述了银企信贷重复博弈的理性选择路径，从而最大限度地预防和解决银企单次信贷博弈的负面作用和影响。
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| 关 键 词： | 银企信贷关系 企业声誉 博弈论 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-4098（2005）11-0082-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-09-19 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-09-19 |
Modelling on Repeated Games in Bank-Enterprise Credit Relations |
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| TIAN Yin-hua,HE Jian-ming,CAO Jia-ying. Modelling on Repeated Games in Bank-Enterprise Credit Relations[J]. Systems Engineering, 2005, 23(11): 82-84 |
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| Authors: | TIAN Yin-hua HE Jian-ming CAO Jia-ying |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Business,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China;2.Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan 411201,China |
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| Abstract: | Generally speaking,the stability degrees of Bank-Enterprise Relationship depend on their Credit Relations.(Under) the Asymmetry of information,in consideration of Enterprises' reputation,this paper discusses the repeated games in bank-enterprise credit relations and their multiple-choice ways,thus to prevent and solve some negative effects of the once game of credit. |
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| Keywords: | Bank-Enterprise Credit Relation Enterprises' Reputation Game Theory |
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