有提前期柔性的供应链协调与风险分摊

针对合同制造环境下的需求不确定性导致提前期发生变动而影响高科技产品供应链的上下游决策并产生激励冲突,建立了一种有提前期柔性的供应链协调模型.通过提前期柔性所提供的期权机制来建立采购商和供应商之间基于斯坦伯格博弈的合同谈判过程,使采购商和供应商共同确定合理的交付提前期的变动幅度、柔性成本分摊比例和最优订货策略.研究发现,这种双向操作的风险分摊机制能使高科技供应链渠道达到帕累托最优,从而使供应链协调、改进供应链绩效.

A Mechanism of Supply Chain Coordination and Risk Sharing Through Lead-Time Flexibility

Abstract： In the environment of contract manufacturing, demand uncertainty often leads to variation of delivery lead-time and impacts on upstream and downstream decision-making in innovative products supply chain and generates incentive conflicts. A supply chain coordination model provides a Stackelberg game process, which is established by a real option of lead-time flexibility between suppliers and buyers. It makes suppliers and buyers to determine their right policies on the reasonable variable magnitude of delivery lead-time, flexible cost-sharing ratio and optimal order policy. It is found out that this two-way operation of risk sharing mechanisms may make supply chain channel for innovative products to achieve Pareto optimization, thus coordinates the whole supply chain and improves supply chain performance.