国开行国家助学贷款与高校最优激励合同设计

国开行参与国家助学贷款，缓解了国家助学贷款在覆盖面的困境，然而在风险补偿金激励与约束机制下，高校的“惜贷”问题也随之凸显。采用委托-代理理论，分析了政府对高校办理国家助学贷款的最优激励设计，提出应建立财政贴息与风险补偿金转移支付制度，以完善对高校的奖罚制度，强化约束机制。

The national learning-aiding loan of the State Development Bank and the design of the optimum incentive contract of the high education institutions

The State Development Bank provides the national learning- aiding loan, relieving its dilemma. However, under the risk compensation incentive and restraint mechanism, the problem of reluctance to borrow in the high education institutions becomes salient. This paper adopts the commission theory to analyse the government＇s optimum incentive design of the national learning - aiding loan to the high education institutions, putting forward the suggestion that we should establish the financial discount and risk compensation fund transfer system so as to perfect the award and punishment system for the high education institutions and strengthen the restraint mechanism.