农户参加产权抵押贷款意愿的进化博弈分析

农村产权抵押贷款模式在我国刚刚兴起,发展尚不成熟,农村金融市场依然低效。运用进化博弈理论,构造了农户参与产权抵押贷款的进化博弈模型,模拟了有限理性条件下参加与不参加产权抵押贷款农户之间的相互影响,并最终达到所有需要贷款的农户都会选择产权抵押贷款的稳定策略。最后提出应加大政府、金融机构的宣传力度,让农户更加全面地了解这种贷款政策;政策最初实施时需谨慎,建立配套的产权流转体系;构建完善的农村社会保障体系,解决农户后顾之忧。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Farmers' Willingness to Participate in Property Right Mortgage Loan

Rural property mortgage loans in China have just started,the development is not yet mature,and the rural financial market is still inefficient.By using the evolutionary game theory,the evolutionary game model of farmers involved in property mortgage loans was constructed,the interaction between farmers who participated in and did not participate in the property mortgage loan under the condition of limited rationality was simulated,and ultimately the stable strategy was achieved that all the farmers who need loans will choose property mortgage loans.Finally,the paper put forward to increase the propaganda of the government and financial institutions,so that farmers could understand the loan policy more comprehensively;caution should be taken in the initial implementation of the policy,a complete system of property rights transfer should be established;constructed the perfect rural social security system,proposed policy suggestions to solve farmers' worries.