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| 工作市场信号博弈混同均衡通式 | |
| 引用本文： | 黄怡胜. 工作市场信号博弈混同均衡通式[J]. 中山大学学报(自然科学版), 2001, 40(3): 115-117 |
| 作者姓名： | 黄怡胜 |
| 作者单位： | 中山大学岭南学院, |
| 摘 要： | 提出双混同均衡的概念，作为对混同均衡的推广，基于该概率，给出了工作市场信号博弈混同均衡的一般形式，因而，普通的混同均衡都是它的特例。 |
| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 工作市场信号博弈 混同均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 0529-6579(2001)03-0115-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000-07-24 |
A General Form of Hybrid Equilibria in Job-Market Signaling Games |
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| HUANG Yi-sheng. A General Form of Hybrid Equilibria in Job-Market Signaling Games[J]. Acta Scientiarum Naturalium Universitatis Sunyatseni, 2001, 40(3): 115-117 | |
| Authors: | HUANG Yi-sheng |
| Abstract: | The idea of bi_hybrid equilibrium is presented. With this generalized definition of hybrid equilibrium,a general form of hybrid equilibria in job_market signaling games is obstained.Both usual hybrid equilibria are special cases of this form. |
| Keywords: | game theory job-market signaling game hybrid equilibrium |
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