Principle or constructive relativity |
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Authors: | Mathias Frisch |
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Affiliation: | University of Maryland, Department of Philosophy, College Park, MD 20742, USA |
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Abstract: | Appealing to Albert Einstein's distinction between principle and constructive theories, Harvey Brown has argued for an interpretation of the theory of relativity as a dynamic and constructive theory. Brown's view has been challenged by Michel Janssen and in this paper I investigate their dispute. I argue that their disagreement appears larger than it actually is due to the two frameworks used by Brown and Janssen to express their respective views: Brown's appeal to Einstein's principle–constructive distinction and Janssen's framing of the disagreement as one over the question whether relativity provides a kinematic or a dynamic constraint. I appeal to a distinction between types of theories drawn by H. A. Lorentz two decades before Einstein's distinction to argue that Einstein's distinction represents a false dichotomy. I argue further that the disagreement concerning the kinematics–dynamics distinction is a disagreement about labels but not about substance. There remains a genuine disagreement over the explanatory role of spacetime geometry and here I agree with Brown arguing that Janssen sees a pressing need for an explanation of Lorentz invariance where no further explanation is needed. |
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Keywords: | Relativity Einstein Lorentz Principle theories Constructive theories Kinematics Dynamics |
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