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Downside-Risk控制下的供应链合作契约研究
引用本文:赵道致,何龙飞.Downside-Risk控制下的供应链合作契约研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(4):34-40.
作者姓名:赵道致  何龙飞
作者单位:天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072
摘    要:供应链合作中的风险控制和利润分配始终是参与方权衡的主要问题.为了研究利润分配和风险控制两个因素在供应链合作中的交互影响,本文运用downside-risk约束对一个三层供应链模型中风险厌恶型分销商与其下游的风险中性零售商之间的合作进行了契约设计和建模.在新契约下风险约束得到满足,且双方利润均有了增量.结果表明对供应链合作契约进行有效设计,风险中性方为风险规避方主动提供相应的风险保护、满足其风险约束,可产生更多的利润,能更好协调供应链.文章最后指出了进一步研究的方向.

关 键 词:供应链  风险控制  向下风险(Downside-Risk)  供应链协调与合作  契约设计
文章编号:1000-6788(2007)04-0034-07
修稿时间:2005年11月25

Research on Supply Chain Cooperative Contract on the Theory of Downside-Risk Control
ZHAO Dao-zhi,HE Long-fei.Research on Supply Chain Cooperative Contract on the Theory of Downside-Risk Control[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2007,27(4):34-40.
Authors:ZHAO Dao-zhi  HE Long-fei
Abstract:The risk-controlling and benefit-sharing is always the primary problem the participants in supply chain balanced.In the paper,a cooperation contract between a risk-averse distributor and a downstream risk-neutral retailer in a three stages supply chain model is designed and modeled in order to study the mutual influence of risk-controlling and benefit-sharing on the cooperation of supply chain partners.As a result,the restriction of Downside-Risk is satisfied and revenue of each other is increased.We can draw a conclusion that the supply chain can be better coordinated and more profit can be produced when the supply chain cooperation contract is designed efficiently and the risk-neutral provide initiatively the risk-averse with necessary risk protecting to satisfy its restriction of risk.Finally,the research direction is indicated.
Keywords:supply chain  risk-control  Downside-Risk  supply chain coordination and cooperation  contract designing
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