| 奖励审计师与防范审计合谋 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 王善平,赵国宇.奖励审计师与防范审计合谋[J].系统工程,2005,23(5):85-88. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 王善平 赵国宇 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 湖南大学,会计学院,湖南,长沙,410079 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372040) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 审计合谋将严重损害独立审计的应有作用与社会地位，而审计师的信息优势与经济人特性使审计合谋更容易发生。本文以委托一代理模型为框架，着重论证奖励审计师以防范审计合谋的效果问题。得出的结论是对审计师实施奖励的作法并不可取。
|
| 关 键 词： | 委托一代理 审计合谋 防范 租金 奖励 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-4098(2005)05-0085-04 |
On Preventing the Auditing Collusion by Rewarding the Auditor |
| |
| WANG Shan-ping,ZHAO Guo-yu.On Preventing the Auditing Collusion by Rewarding the Auditor[J].Systems Engineering,2005,23(5):85-88. |
| |
| Authors: | WANG Shan-ping ZHAO Guo-yu |
| |
| Abstract: | The auditing collusion between the auditor and agent will injury the inherent role and social status of the independent audit seriously. The auditor with the characters of economic man having the information advantage can participate in the auditing collusion more easily. The text uses a principal-agent model as a frame to demonstrate the effect of preventing the auditing collusion by rewarding the auditor. The conclusion of the text is that it is inadvisable to implement reward to the auditor. |
| |
| Keywords: | Principal-agent Auditing Collusion Prevent Rent Reward |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
