| 基于动态博弈模型的付费搜索拍卖广义第二价格机制——规则、均衡与效率分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 姜晖,王浣尘,高朝伟. 基于动态博弈模型的付费搜索拍卖广义第二价格机制——规则、均衡与效率分析[J]. 上海交通大学学报, 2010, 44(3): 349-0353 |
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| 作者姓名： | 姜晖 王浣尘 高朝伟 |
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| 作者单位： | （上海交通大学 安泰经济与管理学院， 上海 200052） |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70450001); 教育部哲学社会科学重点攻关项目(06jzdh021) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对付费搜索拍卖问题，通过分析VCG（Vickrey Clarke Groves）机制优劣势以及搜索引擎结果网页（SERP）位置价值结构，引出并界定了作为简化VCG机制的广义第二价格（GSP）机制，证明了在广告主估价具有可分离的形式时，按点击付费并进行有效排名的GSP机制能够实现VCG均衡.通过数值实验，讨论了动态环境下排名规则对均衡效率和搜索引擎收入的影响，指出了有效排名相对于单纯排名的优势.
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| 关 键 词： | 付费搜索 广义第二价格 VCG机制 拍卖 |
| 收稿时间： | 2009-03-11 |
Research on the Generalized Second Price Mechanism of Sponsored Search Auctions Based on Dynamic Gaming Models |
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| JIANG Hui,WANG Huan-chen,GAO Chao-wei. Research on the Generalized Second Price Mechanism of Sponsored Search Auctions Based on Dynamic Gaming Models[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2010, 44(3): 349-0353 |
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| Authors: | JIANG Hui WANG Huan-chen GAO Chao-wei |
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| Affiliation: | (Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiangtong University, Shanghai 200052, China) |
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| Abstract: | Aiming at the problem of sponsored search auctions,this article introduced and defined the generalized second price(GSP) mechanism as a simplified VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism by stating the advantages and disadvantages of VCG mechanism and analyzing the value structures of positions on the search engine result page(SERP).It proves that when advertisers have separable values,pay-per-click(along) with ranking by effective bids will guarantee the realization of VCG equilibrium under GSP mechanism.A qu... |
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| Keywords: | sponsored search generalized second price(GSP) VCG mechanism auctions |
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