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天然气企业技术创新投入的博弈分析
引用本文:姜尔加,庞玲. 天然气企业技术创新投入的博弈分析[J]. 世界科技研究与发展, 2006, 28(6): 80-83
作者姓名:姜尔加  庞玲
作者单位:西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都,610031;电子科技大学管理学院,成都,610054
摘    要:为解决由于天然气企业技术创新投入不足问题,论文用博弈论方法对创新的滞后效应以及企业和监管人员博弈进行研究,得出如下研究结论:天然气企业技术创新投入的长期效益大于短期经济效益,且企业投入低于长期最佳投入,需要对其进行监管;加大对投入不达标企业的处罚可以在一定程度上提高其投入的概率,但是这种作用随着处罚力度加大而减弱;对监管人员的失职进行惩罚也可以增加企业技术创新投入的概率。

关 键 词:天然气企业  技术创新投入  效益  监管  博弈

Analysis of Technology Innovation Investment of Natural Gas Enterprises based on Game Theory
JIANG Erjia,PANG Ling. Analysis of Technology Innovation Investment of Natural Gas Enterprises based on Game Theory[J]. World Sci-tech R & D, 2006, 28(6): 80-83
Authors:JIANG Erjia  PANG Ling
Abstract:To solve the problem of the insufficient technology innovation investment of natural gas enterprises,through analyzing the lag effect of innovation and the game theory between the enterprise and supervisors,this paper has concluded that the long-term performance of technology innovation in natural gas enterprises is better than short-term performance,and when the investment amount is smaller than the optimum amount,the enterprise needs to supervise the process of the investment;increasing the degree of punish the enterprise can improve the probability of investment,however,at the same time the effect decreasing;punishing the incompetent supervisors can also improve the probability of the enterprises' technology innovation investment.
Keywords:Natural Gas Enterprises  technology innovation investment  benefit  supervision  game theory
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