| ON MANAGERIAL DECISION PROBLEM OF THE AUCTION SITES |
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| 作者姓名： | Kin Keung LAI Jun MA Shouyang WANG |
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| 作者单位： | [1]Department of Management Sciences, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong [2]School of Business, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China. [3]Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100080, China. |
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| 基金项目： | The research was supported by NNSF of China and RGC of Hong Kong Joint Research Scheme （Project No N_CityU103/02）, and also supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China （Project No. 70401004） |
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| 摘 要： | This paper studies one managerial decision problem of the auction sites： how to combine penalties with commissions？ It is shown that when there exists secondary auction market, the auction whose penalty is a linear function of the seller＇s commission will be more efficient than the auction with only commissions but no penalties. It has also been proven that using this strategy can maximize the expected revenue for the seller, the auction site and their total expected revenues.
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| 关 键 词： | 拍卖行 委托拍卖 二级市场 行政决定 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-02-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-02-04 |
On Managerial Decision Problem of the Auction Sites |
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| Kin Keung LAI Jun MA Shouyang WANG.ON MANAGERIAL DECISION PROBLEM OF THE AUCTION SITES[J].Journal of Systems Science and Complexity,2006,19(3):340-351. |
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| Authors: | Kin Keung Lai Jun Ma Shouyang Wang |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Management Sciences, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong;(2) School of Business, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 100029, China;(3) Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100080, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies one managerial decision problem of the auction sites: how to combine penalties with commissions? It is shown that when there exists secondary auction market, the auction whose penalty is a linear function of the seller’s commission will be more efficient than the auction with only commissions but no penalties. It has also been proven that using this strategy can maximize the expected revenue for the seller, the auction site and their total expected revenues. |
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| Keywords: | Auction sites auction with commissions and penalties optimal reserve secondary market |
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