| 企业经营者的动态激励机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘兵,康凯.企业经营者的动态激励机制设计[J].系统工程学报,2001,16(1):50-54. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘兵 康凯 |
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| 作者单位： | 河北工业大学管理学院, |
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| 摘 要： | 相对业绩比较信息能改进委托－代理关系中的激励与效率，设计一个对企业经营者动态的机制既要考虑经营者的前期业绩，也要参照其他经营者的业绩，经营者的努力水平不仅来自于显性报酬契约的激励，还来自于两种隐性激励－声誉效应和棘轮效应的影响，本文运用博弈论的方法研究基于相对业绩比较的动态激励机制设计问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 动态激励 显性激励 隐性激励 企业经营者 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-5781(2001)01-0050-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 1999年9月16日 |
Dynamic incentive
mechanism for managers |
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| LIU Bing,KANG Kai.Dynamic incentive
mechanism for managers[J].Journal of Systems Engineering,2001,16(1):50-54. |
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| Authors: | LIU Bing KANG Kai |
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| Abstract: | Comparative Performance Information can improve the incentives and efficiency in principal agent relationships. To design the incentive mechanism,we not only regard the manager's former performance,but also refer to the other managers' performance. The manager's effort comes from the explicit incentive and two implicit incentives (the reputation effect and ratchet effect). This paper uses Game Theory to study dynamic incentive mechanism on Performance Comparison. |
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| Keywords: | comparative performance information dynamic incentive explicit incentive implicit incentive |
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