不确定环境下国际反恐联盟随机演化博弈模型

国际反恐联盟成员国反恐决策面临着大国政治角逐、宗教信仰与民族结构等外部复杂的随机性因素影响,为国际反恐局势带来了高度的不确定性.本文针对高度不确定环境下国际反恐态势,构建了基于Moran过程的随机演化模型,分别计算出随机因素主导、期望收益主导和超期望收益主导三种情境下,反恐联盟成员国政府反恐策略在不同随机干扰强度下的均衡结果.研究表明,反恐联盟成员国政府采取"先发制人"或"被动反应"的反恐决策,主要取决于三个因素:1)外部随机性因素;2)反恐联盟的规模;3)不同反恐策略的成本收益.如果随机因素造成非理性决策占据主导地位,则两种策略的成本收益和成员国数量决定了成员国策略选择.如果期望收益占据决策主导地位,只有当反恐联盟的成员国数量大于一定的临界规模时,"先发制人"反恐策略才会成为所有成员国的普遍共识.否则,"被动反应"的反恐搭便车行为将成为稳定状态.

Stochastic evolutionary game model of international anti-terrorism alliance under uncertain environment

The counter-terrorism decision-making of the members of the international anti-terrorism coalition is faced with externally complicated random factors such as political competition, religious beliefs and national structure, which brings about high uncertainty for the international counter-terrorism situation. This paper constructs a stochastic evolution model based on the Moran process for the international anti-terrorism situation in a highly uncertain environment. Then, the equilibrium results of the counter-terrorism strategies under different random disturbance intensities are calculated under the three scenarios of stochastic factor dominance, expected payoff dominance and super-expected payoff dominance. Studies have shown that the governments adopt "preemptive strike" or "passive response" strategy, which mainly depend on three factors:1) Irrational external random factors; 2) The scale of the anti-terrorist coalition; 3) Cost-benefit of different counter-terrorism strategies. If the irrational random factors dominate the decision-making, the cost-benefit of the two strategies and the numbers determine the strategic choice of the member states. If the expected payoff dominates the decision-making, the "preemptive strike" strategy will become the general consensus of all member states only when the number of members of the anti-terrorist coalition is greater than a numerical value. Otherwise, the "passive response" anti-terrorist free-riding behavior will become stable strategy.