PPP项目提前终止下社会资本机会主义行为研究

Public-private partnership (PPP)项目提前终止时易发生社会资本的机会主义行为,很有必要研究提前终止过程中社会资本机会主义行为的产生机理与应对措施,以保护政府和公众利益.本文根据公私双方在PPP项目中的关系,构建了政府与社会资本的博弈模型,并在前景理论的假设下,对存在终止预期的公私双方不完全信息静态博弈进行了分析.研究结果发现有限理性使得社会资本在博弈中会从混合策略偏离到纯策略;在不同的终止预期情况下,对偏离造成的影响不同.

Analysis of opportunistic behaviors of the private partner facing early termination in PPP projects

Opportunistic behavior of private partner occurred frequently when PPP (public-private partnership) projects terminate early, therefore, it is necessary to study the mechanism and countermeasures of opportunistic behavior of the private partner during early termination to protect the interests of government and public. According to the relationship between the public and private partners, a game theory model is built. Under the hypothesis of the prospect theory, the private partner's Nash equilibrium in the static games of in complete information is analyzed, proving that limited rationality makes the private partner's deviate from mixed-strategy equilibrium to pure-strategy equilibrium. And different expectations of termination compensation can affect the choice of the private.