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考虑撤单率的电商配送服务能力自建与外包博弈模型与求解
引用本文:戢守峰,孙琦,罗蓉娟. 考虑撤单率的电商配送服务能力自建与外包博弈模型与求解[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(10): 2569-2580. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2017-0200-12
作者姓名:戢守峰  孙琦  罗蓉娟
作者单位:东北大学 工商管理学院, 沈阳 110167
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71971049,71572031,70872019);辽宁省哲学社会科学规划基金项目(L16AZY032)
摘    要:针对在线冷静期内产生消费者撤单行为情况下电商配送服务能力的自建与外包决策问题,引入撤单率,从是否进行合作的角度给出了完全合作博弈、完全非合作博弈和不完全非合作三种合作强度的动态博弈模型,并将其中两种情形划分为三阶段动态博弈过程,采用逆向递归法求解这两种情形下各子博弈均衡解,得到了在线购买环境下电商配送服务能力自建与外包的最优解集.进一步地,在第三种情形下设计了成本分担、利润分配以及风险规避三种子博弈模型,以增强模型的灵活性.数值算例与分析表明电商配送服务能力博弈中,电商决策者能够有效实现撤单行为与成本变动影响下动态博弈的帕累托优化.

关 键 词:撤单率  自建与外包博弈模型  M/M/1排队系统  子博弈均衡解  
收稿时间:2017-02-20

A game theoretic model and method with cancellation rate of e-commerce order for homemade-or-outsourcing logistics service capacity problem
JI Shoufeng,SUN Qi,LUO Rongjuan. A game theoretic model and method with cancellation rate of e-commerce order for homemade-or-outsourcing logistics service capacity problem[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(10): 2569-2580. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2017-0200-12
Authors:JI Shoufeng  SUN Qi  LUO Rongjuan
Affiliation:School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110167, China
Abstract:This paper presents a new making-or-outsourcing game model, which is different from traditional logistics capacity planning systems in that it considers cancellation rate of e-commerce order within the allowed cooling-off period. The three-layer dynamic game theory based cooperation of gradient includes completely cooperative game policy, non-cooperative game policy, and incompletely non-cooperative game policy, and then the first two cases has been divided into three-stage dynamic game process. The equilibrium solution of each sub-game in the first two cases and the optimal solution set of homemade-or-outsourcing logistic service capacity problem are obtained by the backward recursive algorithm. Further, in the third case three kinds of sub-game coordination mechanism—cost sharing, profit distribution and risk aversion—have been designed to enhance the flexibility of the model. Numerical examples and analyzes show that the decision maker can effectively achieve the Pareto optimization of dynamic game under the influence of withdrawal behavior and cost change.
Keywords:cancellation rate of e-commerce order  homemade-or-outsourcing game model  M/M/1 queue system  sub-game equilibrium  
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