| 基于企业和ELSA之间的劳动力市场博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 姜林.基于企业和ELSA之间的劳动力市场博弈[J].重庆邮电学院学报(自然科学版),2002(4). |
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| 作者姓名： | 姜林 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆师范学院数学系 重庆400047 |
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| 摘 要： | 在文献 1～ 5 ]的基础上 ,将不确定的劳动力市场需求进行随机化处理 ,把劳动力市场看成雇佣企业、外部劳动供应机构 (EL SA)、工人三者进行博弈 ,侧重讨论了雇佣企业和外部劳动供应机构 (EL SA)之间的有条件博弈 ,通过数学推导 ,给出了企业和外部劳动供应机构 EL SA的最优劳动力合同
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| 关 键 词： | 外部劳动供应机构 纳什均衡 期望收益 |
A Labor Market Game between Enterprises and ELSA |
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| JIANG Lin.A Labor Market Game between Enterprises and ELSA[J].Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Natural Sciences Edition),2002(4). |
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| Authors: | JIANG Lin |
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| Abstract: | If the uncertainty labor market is supposed to be a random variable, the labor market falls into three departments: enterprises, ELSA and workers on the basis of documents, and this is regarded as a game among the three departments. In this paper, the author introduces the conditional labor market game between the enterprises and ELSA and offers the optimal labor contract between the management and ELSA. |
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| Keywords: | ELSA Nash's equilibrium expected profits |
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