| 垄断行业的进入博弈及管制绩效评价研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵宇,李洪波,张宗益.垄断行业的进入博弈及管制绩效评价研究[J].系统工程学报,2006,21(6):606-612. |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵宇 李洪波 张宗益 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030
2. 重庆大学数理学院,重庆,400030 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立和分析垄断产业中在位者成本为连续分布时的不完全信息市场进入动态博弈模型,研究管制对产业均衡的影响.将寻租成本引入博弈模型,得出在位者和进入者的行为模式与管制力度的关系,管制对社会福利和消费者剩余的影响;并通过数例分析检验研究结论.
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| 关 键 词： | 垄断行业 管制 寻租成本 博弈 效率 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-5781（2006）06-0606-07 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-07-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-07-122005-07-18 |
Study on the entry game and evaluation of regulation performance in a monopoly industry |
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| ZHAO Yu,LI Hong-bo,ZHANG Zong-yi.Study on the entry game and evaluation of regulation performance in a monopoly industry[J].Journal of Systems Engineering,2006,21(6):606-612. |
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| Authors: | ZHAO Yu LI Hong-bo ZHANG Zong-yi |
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| Institution: | 1. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China; 2. College of Science, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China |
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| Abstract: | The paper analyzes the effect of regulation on an industry equilibrium.This is achieved by analyzing an incomplete information market entry dynamic game model.Assume the cost of the existing firm obeys continuously distribution in the monopoly industry.The cost of rent-seeking is introduced into the game model.We then analyze the relationship between the pattern of behavior and the level of the regulation of existing firm along with other entrants,as well as the effect of the regulation social welfare and customer surplus.The result is finally tested by examples and case studies. |
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| Keywords: | monopoly industry regulation cost of rent-seeking game efficiency |
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