不对称信息下短视代理人的投资行为

信息不对称下短视代理人投资行为如何扭曲长期悬而未解，BS经营短视行为低效率一般化特征的结论，依赖于限制性信息假设条件，因而并不具有普适性；Paul证明了隐藏行动类型并不必然导致长期项目过低投资，笔者对隐藏信息类型分析的结论是：一般来说，对长期项目过度投资，只有当经理比股市拥有更多关于长期项目而不是关于短期项目的信息时才会出现。

Investment Behavior of Myopic Agent under Asymmetry Information

The investment behavior distortion of myopic agent with asymmetry information has remained unsolved,the BS characterization of the inefficiency from managerial myopic hinges on a restrictive informational assumption and therefore is not generally applicable. Paul demonstrates that it is not necessarily true that hidden-action type leads to under-investment in long-run projects. We examine the hidden-information type and arrive on analysis:in general,over-investment in the long-run project can be ensured only if the manager has more information than the stock market about the long-run project,but not about the short-run project.