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回购契约下Stackelberg博弈的供应链利润分配
引用本文:庞庆华.回购契约下Stackelberg博弈的供应链利润分配[J].科学技术与工程,2009,9(16).
作者姓名:庞庆华
作者单位:河海大学商学院,常州,213022
基金项目:河海大学常州校区人文社科基金,江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金 
摘    要:考虑由单供应商和单零售商组成的二级供应链,建立了供应商与零售商的Stackelberg利润分配博弈模型.用回购契约作为这一供应链模型利润再分配的手段,分析了供应商占主导地位的供应链利润分配均衡.结果表明:供应商可以利用自己的主导地位使得零售商只能获得保留利润,而自己则获得供应链中所有的剩余利润,所制定的利润分配参数也能使供应链达到最优利润水平.

关 键 词:供应链  回购契约  Stackelberg博弈  供应商主导

Research on Profit Division in Supply Chains Based on Stackelberg Game with Buyback Contract
PANG Qing-hua.Research on Profit Division in Supply Chains Based on Stackelberg Game with Buyback Contract[J].Science Technology and Engineering,2009,9(16).
Authors:PANG Qing-hua
Institution:Business School;Hohai University;Changzhou 213022;P.R.China
Abstract:Considering a two-stage supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer,a Stackelberg game of profit division is established. With buyback contract employed in the game as a profit division approach,equilibrium process is analysed when the supplier is in the dominating station. Equilibrium analysis shows that the retailer can only get the reserved profit,while the supplier can obtain all the profit leaved,and the parameters made by supplier can also coordinate the supply chain to the optimal level.
Keywords:supply chain buyback contract stackelberg game supplier dominating  
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