| 银行之间无限重复博弈共谋的研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李锋. 银行之间无限重复博弈共谋的研究[J]. 复旦学报(自然科学版), 2003, 42(2): 135-141 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李锋 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学,数学研究所,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部博士点专项基金资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 在无限重复博弈的框架中,分析了银行为取得好的收益而共谋确定存款利率的问题.在一定的条件下,银行之间可以达成共谋,并且所有银行都可以从共谋中受益.
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| 关 键 词： | Nash均衡 子博弈完美Nash均衡 共谋 |
| 文章编号： | 0427-7104(2003)02-0135-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-03-29 |
Study of Conspiracy between Banks of Infinite Repeated Game |
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| LI Feng. Study of Conspiracy between Banks of Infinite Repeated Game[J]. Journal of Fudan University(Natural Science), 2003, 42(2): 135-141 |
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| Authors: | LI Feng |
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| Abstract: | Analyse the problem that several banks decide its rate of deposit at the same time. Use the means of infinite repeated game discuss the competition and cooperation conspiracy between the banks when they will effect each other at long period of time. It is obvious that all banks can benefit from conspiracy and the banks can reach a conspiracy with some condition. |
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| Keywords: | Nash equalization infinite repeated game conspiracy |
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