| Abstract: | Attention is drawn to two closely related functions served by scientific theory (called here ‘mensurative’ and ‘reconstructive estimation’) which are of fundamental importance in physical science but as yet little discussed in philosophy. As indicated by their names, they constitute the theoretical basis of physical measurements.After analysing some historically important examples and sketching the historical development of these ideas, this paper examines the similarities and differences between the estimate functions of theory and such well-known functions as prediction and explanation. The pervasiveness of the estimative functions even when theory is but poorly developed is noted; and some of the problems raised by the physical equivalence of the measuring instrument to the object measured are discussed. The relations of estimation to ‘reductive logic’ are also considered.We then apply this understanding of estimative functioning to distinguishing experimental errors from those genuine anomalies which result in discovery. It is also shown that there can be no facts established nor any verification of predictions except on the basis of valid estimates derived, in turn, from antecedently accepted theories. |
