B2C电子商务质量不确定性定价机制设计及其优化

在不确定性定价下,电子商务企业事先承诺,当提供的产品或服务为劣等质量时将给予顾客一定的价格折扣,消费者根据公开可获得的历史数据来确定企业产品质量表现概率并做出购买决策。研究了企业的私有信息和企业与市场在产品质量信念上的区别对定价方案选择的重要作用,表明质量不确定性定价是降低质量不确定性在B2C电子商务中负面影响的有用机制。当市场低估了企业的表现时,不确定性定价合约是有价值的;对于企业的最优方案是:对不良表现提供完全价格折扣,而对合格表现相应地给予更高的价格。

Designing and Optimizing Quality-Contingent Pricing Mechanism of B2C e-Commerce

This paper demonstrates that quality-contingent pricing is a useful mechanism for mitigating the negative effects of quality uncertainty in e-commerce. Under contingency pricing of an information good or service, the firm pre-announces a rebate for poor performance. Consumers determine performance probabilities using publicly available historical performance data. Examining the monopoly case, we explicate the critical role of private information and differences in belief between the firm and market in the choice of pricing scheme. Contingent pricing is useful when the market underestimates the firms performance; then it is optimal for the firm to offer a full-price rebate for mis-performance, with a correspondingly higher price for meeting the performance standard. Contingency pricing is a dominant strategy for a firm when the market underestimates the firms' performance.