| 用人合同的委托代理问题及对策 |
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| 引用本文： | 袁青川.用人合同的委托代理问题及对策[J].科技情报开发与经济,2007,17(10):216-217. |
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| 作者姓名： | 袁青川 |
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| 作者单位： | 石河子大学商学院,新疆五家渠,831300 |
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| 摘 要： | 分析了由于合同的不完整性和不明确性以及合同双方的信息不对称性可能引发的“道德风险”的问题,提出了一些加强合同自我强化的措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 劳动合同 委托-代理问题 剩余分享 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-6033（2007）10-0216-02 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-11-11 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年11月11 |
The Principal-agent Problem of the Employment Contract and the Countermeasures |
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| YUAN Qing-chuan.The Principal-agent Problem of the Employment Contract and the Countermeasures[J].Sci-Tech Information Development & Economy,2007,17(10):216-217. |
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| Authors: | YUAN Qing-chuan |
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| Institution: | YUAN Qing-chuan |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes on the problem of the "moral risk" probably caused by the imperfection and ambiguity of the contract and the asymmetric information of both sides of the contract, and advances some measures for strengthening the self-strengthening of the contract. |
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| Keywords: | labor contract principal-agent problem residual sharing |
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