考虑社会责任的跨国企业对外投资社会政治风险防控博弈分析

履行社会责任对东道国社会政治风险具有显著的正向管制作用,但在东道国复杂多变的社会制度背景下,跨国企业可能因"负责过度"而招致非议,因"努力不足"而丧失深度合作机会.因此,履行社会责任的努力水平决策成为了跨国企业普遍关注的焦点难题.本文以履行社会责任为研究视角,以鼓励契约、抑制契约和一视同仁契约刻画东道国政府对跨国企业的不同合作策略,构建了跨国企业对外投资社会政治风险防控互惠微分博弈模型.研究发现,东道国的社会政治环境稳定程度显著影响双方收益和最优契约的选择路径.对跨国企业来说,当声誉衰减速度较小时,鼓励契约在短周期合作中最优,一视同仁契约在长周期合作中最优,完全抑制契约始终最差,但部分低作为跨国企业也可能对不完全抑制契约免疫.当声誉衰减速度较大时,鼓励契约始终最优;抑制契约始终最差,甚至还会侵蚀跨国企业原有资本.

The game analysis on transnational investment social political risk prevention and control of multinational enterprises considering the perspective of social responsibility

The implementation of social responsibility has significant effect on political risk prevention and control in host countries. However, under the complicated and volatile social background of host countries, transnational corporations may either be criticized for involving too much in fulfilling their social responsibility or lose the opportunity of getting further cooperation because of their “insufficient” performance. Therefore, the decision-making on social responsibility performance has been extensively concerned as a prominent challenge for transnational corporations. From the perspective of implementing social responsibility, this paper portrayed various cooperation strategies between host countries and transnational corporations by studying on incentive contract, restraining contract and non-discrimination contract, and constructed differential game models on political risk prevention and control for the foreign investment reciprocity of transnational corporations. The research shows that the political environment stability in host country has significant impact on mutual profit and path selection on optimal agreement. For transnational enterprises, small reputation decay rate makes incentive contract the optimal choice in short term cooperation, and non-discrimination contract performed better than others in long term cooperation, while complete restraining contract has the worst effect. However, transnational enterprises, which can inefficiently fulfilled their responsibility, may be immune to incomplete restraining contract. When reputation decay rate gets higher, incentive contract is still optimum, while complete restraining contract, which remain to be the worst, may even erode the invested capital of the corporation.