供应能力制约下的VMI策略及其信息价值研究

研究了供应商存在能力制约下,实施供应链信息共享的策略及其信息价值的问题.建立一个1供应商N零售商的两级供应链,通过扩展的“报童问题”,研究在供应商存在能力限制时的供应链运作情况;证明了供应能力的波动将导致系统成员进行短缺博弈,从而引起供应链系统费用的增加和效率的降低;提出实施信息共享策略,建立供应商管理库存模式(VMI),并建立相应的数学模型,求得问题的“纳什均衡”,证明信息共享与合作可以改善供应链系统,降低运作成本.进一步的数值分析表明,在供应能力(服务水平)为35%到90%之间时,VMI策略可以带来显著效益,最高可以节省28.7%的系统费用;在能力趋于严重不足和能力充裕两种情况下,信息价值将递减,并最后趋于0.

VMI strategy and its value of information in capacitated supply chain

To study the information sharing strategies as well as its value in supply chain when capacity of the supplier is under limitation,we set up a two-echelon supply chain with one finite capacity supplier and N retailers.Via the patulous "newsvendor problem",we study the performances of the capacitated supply chain.It is shown that variance of capacity will lead to a rationing game between the members,and then will increase the system cost and decrease the system efficiency.Moreover,we present some strategies of information sharing and Vendor Management Inventory(VMI) and set up the relevant mathematic model as well.By comparing the newsvendor solution and the Nash equilibrium,we show that information sharing can improve the system performances greatly and reduce the system cost by some 28.7% in maximum.