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非对称信息对供应链质量成本决策的影响
引用本文:张翠华,黄小原.非对称信息对供应链质量成本决策的影响[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2003,24(3):303-305.
作者姓名:张翠华  黄小原
作者单位:东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳,110004
基金项目:辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目 ( 9910 2 0 0 2 0 8)
摘    要:研究了不同信息条件下供应链的质量成本决策问题 ,建立了对称信息和非对称信息下供应商和购买商的质量决策模型·其中 ,质量预防水平为供应商的决策变量 ,质量评价水平和质量损失惩罚是购买商的决策变量·分析了购买商的质量评价结果隐匿情况对供应商的质量预防决策和购买商的质量评价决策的影响 ,并进行了仿真计算·与对称信息的情况相比 ,当购买商的产品评价结果隐匿时 ,供应商的预防活动水平偏低 ,而购买商的产品评价活动更充分 ,直接导致供应链的质量预防成本降低 ,而质量评价成本增加

关 键 词:非对称信息  供应链  质量成本  预防  评价  决策
文章编号:1005-3026(2003)03-0303-03
修稿时间:2002年9月17日

Effect of Asymmetric Information on Supply Chain Quality Cost Decision
ZHANG Cui hua,HUANG Xiao yuan.Effect of Asymmetric Information on Supply Chain Quality Cost Decision[J].Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science),2003,24(3):303-305.
Authors:ZHANG Cui hua  HUANG Xiao yuan
Abstract:Supply chain quality cost decision problem was studied under different information backgrounds. Supply chain quality decision models including a buyer and a supplier were set up with regards to different information backgrounds. In the models, quality prevention variable was decided by the supplier,but the quality evaluation and penalty for quality failure variables were decided by the buyer. Then, effect of buyer's hidden quality evaluation information on supply chain quality cost was analyzed. Simulation results show that supplier prevention activity is lower and buyer evaluation level is higher compared with symmetric information condition when buyer evaluation result cann't be observed.This led to lower quality prevention cost but higher quality evaluation cost.
Keywords:asymmetric information  supply chain  quality cost  prevention  evaluation  decision
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