基于信念的动态博弈理论的P2P激励模型

P2P是自治的网络系统,近年来P2P网络中出现了大量的free-riding节点和恶意节点,这些节点的不合作行为不仅不能对系统提供服务,还会对系统进行恶意的破坏,对系统的性能和用户满意度造成了很大的影响.为此,该文利用博弈论的相关知识提出了基于不完全信息的动态博弈理论的P2P激励机制,经过分析及仿真实现表明,该文提出的机制是简单且有效的.

P2P Incentive Mechanism Based on Beliefs Dynamic Game of Incomplete Information

With the widespread use of P2P system,user proficiency of P2P principles is increasing.A large number of free-riding nodes and malicious nodes emerge in P2P networks,which can not provide services and have malicious damage,and the result is significant declines of system performance and user satisfaction.In order to solve the problem,an incentive mechanism based on reputation for unstructured P2P network is proposed in this paper.It stimulates nodes to provide services for their own maximum benefits and encourages cooperative nodes and to punish malicious nodes by a direct,reciprocal and equivalent transaction.The new proposed method has been analyzed and simulated with a series of tests.Experimental results show that the proposed incentive mechanism can solve problem simply and effectively.