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委托代理理论与中国企业家队伍
引用本文:朱昌蕙. 委托代理理论与中国企业家队伍[J]. 成都大学学报(自然科学版), 1997, 16(4): 40-47
作者姓名:朱昌蕙
作者单位:华西医科大学人文社会科学部!成都,610081
摘    要:本文运用委托代理理论,从新的角度揭示了国有企业改革中的错综关系,阐明了中国企业家队伍难以健康发展和壮大的症结所在;委托人和代理人之间缺乏有效的制衡激励机制与有力的约束机制,在此基础上探讨了中国企业家激励和约束机制的构建。

关 键 词:委托代理  败德行为  逆向选择  制衡机制

The Principal-Agtnt Theory and China''''sEnterpristr Contingent
Zhu Changhui. The Principal-Agtnt Theory and China''''sEnterpristr Contingent[J]. Journal of Chengdu University (Natural Science), 1997, 16(4): 40-47
Authors:Zhu Changhui
Affiliation:Zhu Changhui
Abstract:In this paper the principal-agent theory is applied to reueal from a new angle those intricaterelations existing the reform of the state-run enterprises and to expound the crux of diffieulty inthe deuelopment and growing of China's enterpriser contingent lies in the absence of an effectiveequilibrant mechanism that is, an effectiue encouraging mechanism and forceful restaining one,and accordingly, to wakes a study and discussion on the construction of the both encouraging andrestaining mechanism for China's enterprisers.
Keywords:the principal-agent degenerate behavior contrary sellection equilibrantmechanism  
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