| 会计信息披露的博弈论分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张学英. 会计信息披露的博弈论分析[J]. 华北科技学院学报, 2006, 3(1): 107-109 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张学英 |
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| 作者单位： | 山西大同大学(筹)山西,大同,037003 |
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| 摘 要： | 会计信息的披露方和使用方之间存在着目标函数的不一致,由此导致博弈各方之间不同的行为选择策略,那么在将会计信息视作一种公共商品时,需通过高标准、统一的会计准则的制定以及对会计信息披露的内容、形式和质量保障机制的规范来实现会计信息披露的纳什均衡.
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| 关 键 词： | 会计信息披露 博弈主体 纳什均衡 会计准则 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-7169（2006）01-0107-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-03-01 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-03-01 |
Game theory analysis of accounting information disclosure |
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| ZHANG Xue-ying. Game theory analysis of accounting information disclosure[J]. Journal of North China Institute of Science and Technology, 2006, 3(1): 107-109 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Xue-ying |
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| Abstract: | Existing inconsistency of objective function between accounting information disclosures and users, there are different action selective strategy among different game players. So when accounting information is considered as a public commodity, the Nash equilibrium of accounting information disclosure can be realized by constituting high standard, unified accounting standard and criterion aimed at the content, form and quality insurance system. |
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| Keywords: | accounting information disclosure game player game theory Nash equilibrium accounting standard |
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