| 高层管理创新,公司业绩和企业管理决策:香港市场的实证分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张曙光,蔡定教,陈芝兰. 高层管理创新,公司业绩和企业管理决策:香港市场的实证分析[J]. 中国科学技术大学学报, 2005, 35(6): 936-946 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张曙光 蔡定教 陈芝兰 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中国科学技术大学统计金融系,安徽,合肥,230026
2. 香港中银国际集团证券有限公司,香港 |
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| 基金项目： | Supported by NSFC（10201029）. |
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| 摘 要： | 通过对香港上市公司的实际数据实证分析,研究了管理创新、公司业绩以及企业管理之间的关系.主要结论表明香港上市公司的管理效用的水平主要由公司规模决定,而非公司的市场业绩;同时以股份为工具的补偿机制也不能有效促进管理层对小股东的利益和公司业绩的关注,董事会也未能有效制订对高级经理层的补偿奖励合约.这些实证结果与众多上市公司为提升企业决策水平指定的各种条款相吻合.
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| 关 键 词： | 企业管理 补偿 所有权 董事会 |
| 文章编号： | 0253-2778(2005)06-0936-11 |
| 收稿时间： | 2003-11-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-05-20 |
Top Managerial Incentives, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis of Hong Kong Data |
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| ZHANG Shu-guang,CAI Ding-jiao,CHEN Zhi-lan. Top Managerial Incentives, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis of Hong Kong Data[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology of China, 2005, 35(6): 936-946 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Shu-guang CAI Ding-jiao CHEN Zhi-lan |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Statistics and Finance, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 ,China; 2. BOCI Securities Limited, Bank of China (International |
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| Abstract: | An empirical analysis on relationships among managerial incentives, firm performance and corporate governance with the samples from Hong Kong listed companies is given. The main results indicate that the levels of executive pay are largely driven by firm size, not by firm performance, and equity-based compensation does not necessarily motivate managers to maximize shareholders'wealth and improve firm performance, and moreover, the boards works inefficiently in designing compensation contracts for top managers. These results are consistent with many of the guidelines for improving corporate governance. |
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| Keywords: | corporate governance compensation ownership board of directors |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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