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同时考虑损失厌恶和过度自信的供应链Stackelberg博弈与决策
引用本文:魏光兴,唐 瑶,覃燕红. 同时考虑损失厌恶和过度自信的供应链Stackelberg博弈与决策[J]. 江西师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2017, 0(1): 20-27
作者姓名:魏光兴  唐 瑶  覃燕红
作者单位:1.重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆 400074; 2.重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆 400054
摘    要:在完全理性的供应商与具有损失厌恶和过度自信的零售商组成的供应链系统中,构建Stackelberg博弈模型,分析同时考虑损失厌恶和过度自信的供应链决策.研究表明:当仅考虑损失厌恶时,供应商决定的收益分享比率、零售商选择的销售努力水平、供应商效用和零售商效用都小于完全理性情形,且它们都随着损失厌恶增强而降低.当仅考虑过度自信时,结果正好相反,这说明损失厌恶与过度自信各自对供应链决策的单独影响是相反的.在同时考虑损失厌恶和过度自信时,收益分享比率、销售努力水平、供应商效用和零售商效用仍然都随着损失厌恶增强而降低和随着过度自信程度增强而上升,这说明损失厌恶和过度自信对供应链决策的影响是相对独立的; 而且,供应商效用与零售商效用均大于仅考虑损失厌恶情形而小于仅考虑过度自信情形,当损失厌恶程度大于某临界值时零售商效用与供应商效用均小于完全理性情形,当损失厌恶程度小于某临界值时双方效用均大于完全理性情形,这说明损失厌恶和过度自信对供应链决策的作用之间存在相互影响的交叉效应.因此,损失厌恶和过度自信都是影响供应链决策的重要因素,忽略任何一种都是不完备的.

关 键 词:供应链  损失厌恶  过度自信  Stackelberg博弈

The Stackelberg Game Model and Decision Making of Supply Chain Incorporating Loss Aversion and Overconfidence
WEI Guangxing,TANG Yao,QIN Yanhong. The Stackelberg Game Model and Decision Making of Supply Chain Incorporating Loss Aversion and Overconfidence[J]. Journal of Jiangxi Normal University (Natural Sciences Edition), 2017, 0(1): 20-27
Authors:WEI Guangxing  TANG Yao  QIN Yanhong
Affiliation:1.School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China; 2.School of Management,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054,China
Abstract:By developing a Stackelberg game model to describe the supply chain consisted of a rational supplier and a retailer with the preferences of loss aversion and overconfidence,the decision making of the supply chain incorporating the loss aversion and overconfidence simultaneously is analyzed.It is found that in the case of only considering the loss aversion,the revenue sharing rate decided by the supplier,the marketing effort chosen by the retailer and their respective utilities all are decreasing with the loss aversion,and all are less than the case of complete rationality.While in the case of only considering the overconfidence,the opposite results are obtained.So,the separate individual influence of the loss aversion and overconfidence are contrary.Moreover,in the case of considering both the loss aversion and overconfidence,the revenue sharing rate,the marketing effort and respective utilities all decrease with the loss aversion but increase with the overconfidence also.Hereby,the influences of the loss aversion and overconfidence is relatively independent.The utilities of the supplier and the retailer are less than the case considering only the overconfidence but more than the case considering only the loss aversion,and less than the case of complete rationality when the degree of loss aversion is greater than a certain critical value but more than the case of complete rationality when the degree of loss aversion is smaller than the certain critical value.Hereby,there exit a cross effect between the influences of the loss aversion and overconfidence,which will change each other.Therefore,both the loss aversion and overconfidence are two important factors influencing the decision making of the supply chain,and it is incomplete if ignoring any one.
Keywords:supply chain  loss aversion  overconfidence  Stackelberg game
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