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供应链中绿色技术创新合作的演化博弈分析
引用本文:周永圣,梁淑慧.供应链中绿色技术创新合作的演化博弈分析[J].江西师范大学学报(自然科学版),2017,0(1):28-34.
作者姓名:周永圣  梁淑慧
作者单位:北京工商大学商学院,北京 100048
摘    要:基于演化博弈理论研究供应链系统中制造商与供应商进行绿色技术创新合作的不同策略选择.研究表明:企业采取绿色技术创新合作与双方进行绿色技术创新合作的投入产出比密切相关,当投入产出比在一定范围浮动时,制造商与供应商便会出现多种演化稳定均衡策略.引入政府的惩罚机制进行调控,对于投机取巧、搭便车的企业进行惩罚,迫使他们实施绿色技术创新合作.

关 键 词:绿色技术创新  搭便车  演化博弈

The Analysis of Evolutionary Game Model on Green Technology Innovation Cooperation in the Supply Chain
ZHOU Yongsheng,LIANG Shuhui.The Analysis of Evolutionary Game Model on Green Technology Innovation Cooperation in the Supply Chain[J].Journal of Jiangxi Normal University (Natural Sciences Edition),2017,0(1):28-34.
Authors:ZHOU Yongsheng  LIANG Shuhui
Institution:Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048
Abstract:For the supply chain system consisting of manufacturers and suppliers,it is studied that manufacturers and suppliers decide whether to choose green technology innovation cooperation strategy based on evolutionary game theory.The results show that the investment strategies used by both suppliers and manufacturers are directly related to the ratio of input-output.When the input-output ratios change in different scope,some evolutionary-balanced strategies will be found.The geovernment will use punish mechanisms to punish the free rider behavior and force the supplier or manufacturer to choose green technology innovation cooperation strategy.
Keywords:green technology innovation  free rider  the evolutionary game
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