| 高阶信念理论如何解决关于意识的难问题 |
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| 引用本文： | 李楠. 高阶信念理论如何解决关于意识的难问题[J]. 自然辩证法研究, 2012, 0(5): 15-19 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李楠 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉大学哲学学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 如何解释现象意识是意识的难问题。高阶信念理论试图为现象意识提供还原性的说明,其中最有代表性的是罗森赛尔的实在主义高阶信念理论和卡拉特斯的倾向主义理论。本文批判性地分析了这两种理论对现象意识的说明,指出其困难,最后提供了原创性的改进版本。
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| 关 键 词： | 现象意识 高阶信念理论 倾向主义 功能性 |
How does the HOT theory answer the hard problem |
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| Li Nan. How does the HOT theory answer the hard problem[J]. Studies In Dialectics of Nature, 2012, 0(5): 15-19 |
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| Authors: | Li Nan |
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| Affiliation: | Li Nan(Departpment of Philosophy Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei 430072,China) |
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| Abstract: | The hard problem of consciousness concerns with the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.Higher-order thought theories provide reductive methods to answer the hard problem,of which the most famous ones are the actualist HOT theory advanced by Rosenthal and the dispositionalist HOT theory advanced by Carruthers.I critically analyze these two methods and give an improved version. |
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| Keywords: | Phenomenal Consciousness Higher-order Thought Dispositionalist Functional |
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