| 基于不对称信息VC代理的激励监控机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴建军,杨红玲.基于不对称信息VC代理的激励监控机制[J].合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版),2006,29(11):1417-1419. |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴建军 杨红玲 |
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| 作者单位： | 合肥工业大学,管理学院.安徽,合肥,230009 |
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| 摘 要： | 按照代理和经济学相关理论,在信息不对称状态下,委托人要实现资本目标及降低代理成本,必须合理激励和监控代理人努力行为.文章基于VC代理的本质特征和内在联系,构建模型研究其激励和监控机制问题,借此为非信息对称下的VC最优契约执行提供新的思路.
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| 关 键 词： | 不对称信息 VC代理 激励机制 监控约束 风险分担 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5060(2006)11-1417-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年11月11 |
Study of the incentive-monitoring mechanism of VC agency based on asymmetric information |
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| WU Jian-jun,YANG Hong-ling.Study of the incentive-monitoring mechanism of VC agency based on asymmetric information[J].Journal of Hefei University of Technology(Natural Science),2006,29(11):1417-1419. |
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| Authors: | WU Jian-jun YANG Hong-ling |
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| Abstract: | According to the theories of agency and economics,the principle needs to encourage and supervise agent's efforts rationally in order to realize the capital goal and reduce the agent's cost in case of asymmetric information.In this paper,the essential characteristics of venture capital(VC) agency are discussed,and the model of the incentive-monitoring mechanism is studied.The results provide new ideas for the design of the optimum contract in case of asymmetric information. |
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| Keywords: | asymmetric information venture capital(VC) agent incentive mechanism monitoring constraint risk sharing |
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