Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience” |
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| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University, Philosophy Programme, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637 332, Singapore;Department of Philosophy, Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis, Cavanaugh Hall, 425 University Blvd., Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA;Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, Greece;School of Humanities and Social Sciences, HSS Philosophy Programme, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Universität Bonn, Institut für Philosophie, Am Hof 1, D-53113 Bonn, Germany;Department of Physics, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA;Trinity College, Cambridge CB2 1TQ, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements. Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion of probability can be recovered in the many worlds setting. In particular, Wallace argues that a rational agent has to assign probabilities in accordance with the Born rule. This argument relies on a rationality constraint that Wallace calls state supervenience. I argue that state supervenience is not defensible as a rationality constraint for Everettian agents unless we already invoke probabilistic notions. |
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