| 医方道德风险及其与共保关系 |
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| 引用本文： | 顾孟迪,何思遥,张延锋.医方道德风险及其与共保关系[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(5). |
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| 作者姓名： | 顾孟迪 何思遥 张延锋 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
2. 上海财经大学,财经研究所,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | "十一五"国家科技支撑计划课题资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 医疗服务中,医方道德风险主要表现在患者在医疗服务消费过程中,医务人员诱导过度消费的行为,这种行为损害患者利益.在存在医疗保险的情况下,这种行为也损害保险机构的利益.研究表明,在没有医疗保险的情况下,医方道德风险体现在医疗数量的诱导上;存在医疗保险的情况下,诱导服务的现象依然存在,并且存在共保率越小,诱导需求量越大的情况.
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| 关 键 词： | 医方道德风险 医疗保险 共保 |
Supplier-side Moral Hazard in Medical Services and Its Relationship with Coinsurance |
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| GU Meng-di,HE Si-yao,ZHANG Yan-feng.Supplier-side Moral Hazard in Medical Services and Its Relationship with Coinsurance[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2009,18(5). |
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| Authors: | GU Meng-di HE Si-yao ZHANG Yan-feng |
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| Abstract: | In medical services, supplier-side moral hazard appears in the form of inducing extravagant health services, which hurts the benefits of patients and insurance institutions. The results of this paper show that without medical insurance system, physicians have the tend to induce more consumption and when there is medical insurance, the less the coinsurance rate, the more the consumption induced. |
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| Keywords: | supplier-side moral hazard medical insurance coinsurance |
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