| 节能减排管制政策的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄鑫,陶小马,杜增华.节能减排管制政策的博弈分析[J].广西大学学报(自然科学版),2008,33(3). |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄鑫 陶小马 杜增华 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 广西大学,机械工程学院,广西,南宁,530004;同济大学,经济管理学院,上海,201804
2. 广西大学,机械工程学院,广西,南宁,530004 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海市科技发展基金，广西大学校科研和教改项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 以博弈论为工具分析政府监管者如何通过财政工具引导企业积极遵守和服从节能减排政策.博弈模型中考虑到财政补贴、税收、罚金等参数对企业支付函数的影响,并导出Stackelberg博弈模型;给出了监管者和企业的最优策略和纳什均衡解;提出了促进企业积极参与节能减排的经济激励管制政策的建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 节能减排 激励政策 Stackelberg博弈 |
Game analysis on control policies of energy conservation and emission reduction |
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| HUANG Xin,TAO Xiao-ma,DU Zeng-hua.Game analysis on control policies of energy conservation and emission reduction[J].Journal of Guangxi University(Natural Science Edition),2008,33(3). |
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| Authors: | HUANG Xin TAO Xiao-ma DU Zeng-hua |
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| Institution: | HUANG Xin~(1,2) TAO Xiao-ma~1 DU Zeng-hua~1 (1.School of Economics , Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 201804,China,2.School of Mechanical Engineering,Guangxi University,Nanning 530004,China) |
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| Abstract: | Using game theory analyze government supervisor how do leads firm to comply and obey energy conservation and emission reduction policy through financial tool.Some parameters such as the finance,tax revenue and fine having effected on participator's payoff function are considered in this game and drawn Stackelberg game model,then work out both supervisor's and firm's optimal strategy and Nash equilibrium.Finally it suggest that how to design economic incentive policy and tool to enhance firm to participate i... |
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| Keywords: | energy conservation and emission reduction incentive policy Stackelberg game |
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