| 信息不对称下项目的融资决策博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 骆品亮,梁静.信息不对称下项目的融资决策博弈模型[J].复旦学报(自然科学版),2003,42(2):215-219,233. |
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| 作者姓名： | 骆品亮 梁静 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学,管理学院,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 2000年复旦大学青年科学技术基金资助项目"基于绩效评价的经营者报酬制度与企业绩效互动关系 |
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| 摘 要： | 在传统的项目融资结构安排博弈中引入投资者,分别讨论资本结构由所有者和经营者安排时的最优激励契约,并探讨了外部股权对经营者行为的影响．
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| 关 键 词： | 项目融资 激励契约 资本结构 融资决策博弈模型 企业 资本运营 融资手段 信息不对称 |
| 文章编号： | 0427-7104(2003)02-0215-05 |
Project Financial Decision Game Model with Asymmetric Information |
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| Abstract: | An outer financier was added into traditional project financial structure games,then the optimal incentive contracts were designed with the owner being delegated to decide the financial structure of project or not. The main conclusions were:the existence of outer equity stake might have different impacts on the action of manager which depends on the delegation of financial structure decisions. |
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| Keywords: | project financing incentive contract capital structure |
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