一类异质物品拍卖机制收益等价性及应用

讨论Winner-pay和All-pay两种不同支付方式下一类异质物品的一级价格拍卖机制的收益特性,以指导拍卖者选择拍卖机制.这类异质物品拍卖广泛应用于网上广告位拍卖和比赛奖金分配中,其特点是各拍卖物品价值具有相关性,投标者只投1个标价,机制根据标价的大小顺序进行物品分配.采用静态贝叶斯博弈分析方法,通过计算两种拍卖方式下拍卖方期望收益,得出两种拍卖机制下拍卖方收益相等的结论;同时,证明了投标者在Winner-pay下的期望支付比All-pay高.从本文拍卖收益计算的特例,还可计算得到k件同质物品拍卖收益等于k 1级密封拍卖的收益.

Unit Demand Auction Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Objects Auction

Symmetric Bayesin game theory is usually adopted to select a suitable kind of payment from Winner-pay and All-pay for a special case of heterogeneous object auction where different objects have relatedvalue and it is also widely used in Internet advertisement-place auctions and the activities of contest prize allocation.In this paper,we assume that each bidder has only one chance to summit a bid during a heterogeneous object auction.We mainly prove that the seller gains the same expected revenue in Winner-pay and All-pay auctions.However,bidders bid more aggressively in Winner-pay auction than in the other auction.Moreover,we specify our model to the single object auction and multi-unit homogeneous objects auction respectively,and conclude that seller's expected revenue is equal to k 1 sealed auction in k unit homogeneous objects auction.