基于固定工资和声誉的国企经理行为动态分析

一般文献的研究认为固定工资无激励效果,但经研究发现,在我国国有企业中,经理人的固定工资也有很强的激励效果.由于国有企业的经理人是通过上级政府行政任命的,上级政府对经理具有很强的约束作用,并且被任命为国有企业的经理人会给其带来很高的效用,即在职消费以及相应的特权.所以,我国国有企业经理人都有较强的声誉考虑.基于这种声誉前提,为了更好地建立经理努力与企业业绩关系的模型,突破传统模型将经理的经营行为分为长期努力、短期行为和普通经营努力,并分别建立了国有企业静态和动态激励模型,分析了固定工资报酬形式下,国有企业经理的行为选择特征,得出了固定工资是如何实现其激励效果的.

An Analysis on Dynamics of Managers’ Behavior of State-Owned Enterprises with Fixed Wages and Reputation

In the literature,it is considered that fixed wages has no incentive effects.However,this study finds that managers of state-owned enterprises in China also have incentive effects under the fixed wages.The reason is that the state-owned enterprises’ managers are employed through administrative appointments by higher authorities.This makes the government has a strong constraint on the managers.Once they are appointed as managers of state-owned enterprises,the job consumption and the corresponding privileges will highly compensate them.Managers of state-owned enterprises are strongly concerned with their reputations.As a premise of reputation,in order to better establish the relationship between effort and enterprise performance,we divide the managers’ business activities into long-term effort,short-term behavior and general management effort and establish static and dynamic incentive models.We analyze the characteristics of behavior choices of the state-owned enterprise managers,and show the incentive effect of fixed wages.