| 非对称信息下供应链的质量预防决策 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 张翠华,黄小原.非对称信息下供应链的质量预防决策[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003,23(12):95-99. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 张翠华 黄小原 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 东北大学工商管理学院 辽宁沈阳110004 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 辽宁省自然科学基金(9910200208) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 研究了非对称信息下供应链的质量预防决策问题,建立了供应商和销售商的质量收益函数,重点考虑了非对称信息下的决策问题已经变成最优控制问题,运用极大值原理推导了销售商产品评价信息隐匿情况下供应商的质量预防的最优解,并进行了仿真计算.
|
| 关 键 词： | 非对称信息 供应链 委托代理 极大值原理 预防 评价 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-6788(2003)12-0095-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年9月27日 |
Supply Chain Quality Prevention Decision under Asymmetric Information |
| |
| ZHANG Cui\|hua,HUANG Xiao\|yuan.Supply Chain Quality Prevention Decision under Asymmetric Information[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2003,23(12):95-99. |
| |
| Authors: | ZHANG Cui\|hua HUANG Xiao\|yuan |
| |
| Institution: | School of Business and Management, Northeastern University,Shenyang 110004, China) |
| |
| Abstract: | Supply chain quality prevention decision problem is studied under asymmetric information. Supply chain quality profit models are set up with regards to seller and supplier. Focus is on the study of decision problem turned into optimal control problem under asymmetric information. Maximal principle is used to get the solution to supplier quality prevention when seller evaluation information is hidden. Simulation calculation is done and simulation results under different information backgrounds are compared . |
| |
| Keywords: | asymmetric information supply chain principal agent maximal principle prevention evaluation |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》下载免费的PDF全文 |
