平台企业排他性竞争对价格策略及社会福利的影响分析

自从2010年腾讯与奇虎的“3q大战”以来,平台企业强制商家“二选一”以及平台间相互屏蔽的排他行为愈演愈烈,给双边市场上的用户带来了诸多不便,引起了社会各界的广泛关注。本研究在Hotelling横向选择模型的基础上进行了拓展,通过模型构建以及数值算例分析的方法,研究了平台企业在商家侧、消费者侧开展排他性竞争对平台价格策略和社会福利的影响。研究结果表明,通过开展排他性竞争,平台可以制定更高的价格从而获利。当两个平台间排他强度同时达到一定强度时,社会总福利下降,在特殊情况下社会福利则有所上升,但这种上升也是舍弃了部分市场参与者的利益而达成的。在进行反垄断治理时,社会总福利的增减并不能作为治理的唯一判断标准,且市场双边两种形态的排他行为均需要引起重视。

Influence Analysis of Exclusive Competition on Price Strategy and Social Welfare of Platforms

Since the "3q War" between Tencent and Qihoo in 2010, the "pick one of two" strategies and "walked garden" implemented by platforms has brought a lot of inconvenience to users in two-sided markets, which has attracted extensive attention from all sectors of society. Extending the Hotelling model, this paper applies model construction and numerical example method, study the influence of exclusive competition on price strategy and social welfare when the platforms carry out exclusive measures on the seller-side and buyer-side. The results show that by competing exclusively, platforms can set higher prices and earn profit. When the exclusivity intensity between the two platforms reaches a certain intensity at the same time, the total social welfare decreases. Under special market circumstances, the social welfare increases, but this increase is only achieved at the expense of the interests of some market participants. In the process of anti-monopoly governance, the increase or decrease of the total social welfare can not be used as the only judgment standard of governance, and the two forms of exclusive competition of the two-sided market both need to be taken seriously.